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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in zero-sum stochastic
games when expert demonstrations are known to be not optimal. Compared to previous works
that decouple agents in the game by assuming optimality in expert strategies, we introduce a new
objective function that directly pits experts against Nash Equilibrium strategies, and we design
an algorithm to solve for the reward function in the context of inverse reinforcement learning
with deep neural networks as model approximations. In our setting the model and algorithm do
not decouple by agent. In order to find Nash Equilibrium in large-scale games, we also propose
an adversarial training algorithm for zero-sum stochastic games, and show the theoretical appeal
of non-existence of local optima in its objective function. In our numerical experiments, we
demonstrate that our Nash Equilibrium and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms address
games that are not amenable to previous approaches using tabular representations. Moreover, with
sub-optimal expert demonstrations our algorithms recover both reward functions and strategies
with good quality.
1 Introduction
In the field of reinforcement learning, various algorithms have been proposed that guide an agent to
make decisions, interact with the environment, and increase the profit or return. Usually, a sequential
decision-making problem is formally defined in the Markov decision process (MDP) formalism: at a
given point of time the agent is subject to a certain state in the environment; different actions lead the
agent to visit different states, as prescribed by a underlying state transition probability distribution
that captures and describes the environment; a reward function is also associated with states (or
state-action pairs) so that the agent receives immediate rewards after each decision. Reinforcement
learning algorithms are reward-driven, aiming for optimal or near-optimal strategies that guide the
agent to act ideally and maximize its cumulative rewards.
As of late, multi-agent reinforcement learning, a generalization of single-agent reinforcement learn-
ing tasks, has been gaining momentum since it is aligned with the growing attention on multi-agent
systems and the applications thereof. A multi-agent task can be purely competitive in its nature: most
sport games are zero-sum and fall into this category; while some games or tasks can be completely
cooperative, such as coordinating multiple robots to carry and transport cargo collaboratively in the
shortest possible time. Moreover, both the competitive and cooperative elements can exist at the
same time, most likely in cooperative tasks where each agent also bears another motivation to save
its own energy or maximize its own interests.
Either for solving a single-agent task or a multi-agent system, reinforcement learning entails the
knowledge of the reward function, or at least observations of immediate reward. For some learning
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tasks, however, we have very little or no knowledge of the reward function, but we do have access to
demonstrations performed by “experts” in the task. For example, successful training of an auto-pilot
system often takes full advantage of human driving behavior datasets. On the contrary, a naive,
manually crafted artificial reward function may fail to capture the sophisticated balancing between
safety, speed, and simplicity in maneuvering when driving a vehicle.
As one of the widely used approaches to these tasks, imitation learning concentrates on recovering
strategies from available demonstrations, which is justifiable as long as we believe that when experts
are performing well enough, agents should be able to perform nicely by simply imitating experts’
moves. An approach, termed as inverse reinforcement learning (IRL), formulates the task as solving
an inverse problem, and strives to infer the reward function from demonstrations of experts. In general,
the former approach is perceived as simpler, while the latter compresses task-related information into
a succinct reward function that is more transferable to further applications.
Existing IRL methodologies in competitive multi-agent IRL settings implicitly assume that demon-
strations are generated by an optimal strategy, and use this optimality of expert strategies to solve
for the hidden reward function. (In a multi-agent system, optimality is usually defined in the sense
of Nash Equilibrium.) In such settings, the model can be decoupled into several single-agent sub-
problems. Yet the more complicated the game is, the farther this optimality assumption may diverge
from the truth. For instance, hardly would anyone believe that players in the Go game, as well as
team games including most sport and online games, manage to find and employ a Nash Equilibrium
strategy.
To take sub-optimality in experts’ demonstrations into account, we propose a completely different
approach to perform multi-agent IRL in zero-sum discounted stochastic games. We still assume experts
should be performing decently well. Therefore, the margin between experts’ performances and those of
optimal strategies should be minimized by the reward function we yield, even though the performance
gap is most likely above zero. Specifically, we take a game-theoretical perspective on competitive
MDPs, and the proposed IRL algorithm alternates between two major steps. In the policy step, we
find a Nash Equilibrium strategy for the game parametrized by the current reward function, while in
the reward step we compare experts’ performances against those of the Nash Equilibrium strategy, and
update the reward function to minimize the performance gap. Our framework significantly departs
from previous works since the model and algorithm do not decouple the agents.
In the policy step, we propose an adversarial training algorithm to solve for Nash Equilibrium
in zero-sum discounted stochastic games. We show the theoretical appeal of guarantee on global
convergence to an optimal solution under this adversarial training formulation, as well as an algorithm
based on deep neural networks for policy models. During the adversarial training we pit the agents
against their optimal opponents, and perform actor-critic style Proximal Policy Optimization in [1]
to improve the agents’ policies. In the reward step, we use a deep neural network as well to model
the reward function. We sample expert actions from demonstrations and optimal actions from models
trained in the policy step, and then conduct stochastic gradient descent to minimize the performance
gap between optimal strategies and experts. It is worth noting that other zero-sum IRL methodologies
decouple the agents and solve two sub-problems (or impose two sets of independent constraints) due
to their optimality assumption, while our algorithm always considers and relies on both agents in the
game to solve for the reward function.
Our major contributions are as follows. First, to the best of our knowledge, our IRL algorithm
is drastically different from all previous competitive multi-agent IRL algorithms, as it is able to
yield the reward function in zero-sum discounted stochastic games after abandoning the optimality
assumption of expert demonstrations and it does not decouple the agents. Second, we propose an
adversarial training algorithm to find a Nash Equilibrium policy in zero-sum stochastic games, and
show the non-existence of local maxima in its objective function. Lastly, by utilizing deep neural
networks and stating the algorithm accordingly, our multi-agent IRL approach addresses larger-scale
games or tasks that are not amenable to previous methods, which rely on tabular representation and
linear or quadratic programming. Our numerical experiments show that, compared with existing
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competitive multi-agent IRL methodologies, our approach manages to solve a large-scale problem and
recover both the reward and policy functions robustly regardless of variation in the quality of expert
demonstrations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The literature review is followed by Section 3,
where we present notation and basic results for zero-sum discounted games in the MDP formalism. In
Section 4 we discuss our IRL algorithm, and in Section 5 we present the Nash Equilibrium algorithm
in zero-sum discounted games and its theoretical analysis. Section 6 demonstrates performance of
our algorithms by means of numerical experiments, and Section 7 discusses some directions for future
work.
2 Related Work
In the area of reinforcement learning, an agent learns to improve its performance in a task by inter-
acting with the environment and learning from its experiences. Usually, performance is defined by
the cumulative reward the agent has obtained throughout the task. This suggests the necessity of
knowledge about the reward function or the observed immediate reward. However, in some cases the
reward function simply remains unknown or is implicit, and all that is accessible to the agents is a
set of demonstrations about how some experts have performed in the task. Under such scenarios, one
of the most straightforward approaches is to perform imitation learning in a supervised fashion. One
such implementation is the DAgger algorithm [2]. The downsides of the supervised imitation learning
approach are: (1) continuous human guidance or interventions are needed sometimes (as in DAgger);
(2) by formulating the task as essentially a regression problem and setting the objective as minimizing
the loss of the prediction error, the agent might fail to handle a complex case, for example, experts
employ a stochastic policy that cannot be approximated by a deterministic function.
On the contrary, IRL approaches aim at recovering the unknown reward function. As an inverse
problem, IRL is ill-defined in most cases because it is not known beforehand how well the experts
have performed in the task. Even if we assume that experts have employed optimal strategies, there
might be multiple reward functions that could explain the demonstrations ideally (note that there
always exist trivial solutions including reward R ≡ 0 for any state or action). Therefore, existing
IRL algorithms formulate distinct objectives or impose different constraints. As discussed in [3],
one dichotomy for classifying IRL methodologies is to consider the algorithm as a margin-based
approach or a probabilistic one. A margin-based method solves IRL by maximizing the margin between
experts’ performances and those of other existing policies ([4] for instance), whereas a probabilistic
method revolves around a probability distribution of possible reward functions, either by maximizing
the probability of a reward function based on observed expert demonstrations ([5] for instance), or
matching the probability distribution of state-action frequency in experts’ demonstrations as in [3].
Due to the formulation of the problem, many IRL methodologies approach the task as an imitation
learning problem in essence. This is especially the case if we either implicitly or explicitly assume
experts’ strategies to be optimal. Abbeel & Ng [4] aim to find policies that are comparable to the best
possible ones under any possible reward function, and thus translate IRL to a distribution matching
problem using linear combinations of pre-set basis functions. The guided cost learning algorithm in
[6], initially thought of as an extension of the maximum entropy IRL method in [5], has been shown
to bear a close connection with generative adversarial networks [7] with the reward function being
the discriminator and the sampling distribution (policy) as the generator. This connection partially
explains why sometimes the recovery of the reward function fails, but the algorithm still obtains a
valid policy function (as Finn et al. [6] observe in their experiments). Generative adversarial imitation
learning [8], as the name suggests, conducts imitation learning, and maintains a reward function for
the sole purpose of providing a gradient for policies functions (similar to discriminators in generative
adversarial networks).
All aforementioned works are in the single-agent setting. Our interest is in competitive multi-agent
systems. To the best of our knowledge, existing IRL works concerning multi-agent competitive games
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make the same assumption that expert demonstrations are optimal. IRL can thus be decoupled into
two sub-problems in two-agent games. Reddy et al. [9] base the whole algorithm on the optimality
assumption on experts’ strategies, and decouple a IRL problem in a general-sum game when updating
the reward function. Lin et al. [10] apply the Bayesian IRL framework in [11] to multi-agent zero-
sum stochastic games, and assume that two agents in the game employ a unique minimax bi-policy
under an unseen reward function. This Bayesian approach solves for the reward function only, and
optimality for both agent’s demonstrations leads to two sets of constraints. As a result of the distinct
formulation, our model does not decouple the two agents. Instead, in our algorithm we always let the
two agents compete against each other, and compare optimal performance against demonstrations to
find the reward function.
As a subroutine in our IRL algorithm, measurement of optimal strategies’ performances entails
the knowledge about Nash Equilibrium strategies as we explicitly compare experts’ demonstrations
against optimal strategies. On solving for Nash Equilibrium in a stochastic game, the past decade has
seen new algorithms including [12], [13], and [14]. Unfortunately, most of these methods do not suit
our case. For instance, the optimization-based ones rely on enumeration of state-action pairs of the
game, which is infeasible for large games. Algorithm in [13] solves for Nash Equilibrium in general-sum
stochastic games, but in the zero-sum case the agents always receive a 0 gradient because the update
steps rely on the sum of returns for both agents, which is fixed at 0 in zero-sum games. In order to
efficiently handle zero-sum games we thereby propose and use an adversarial training algorithm that
finds a Nash Equilibrium strategy using deep neural networks as model approximations.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Zero-Sum Discounted Stochastic Game
From the field of competitive MDPs, we adopt the zero-sum discounted stochastic game setting as
the underlying framework for the current study. Formally, a zero-sum stochastic game is defined by a
tuple 〈S,Af ,Ag, R, P, γ〉, where the quantities are defined as follows.
• Agents and Strategies: f, g denote strategies used by the two agents in the game. Note that
the first order Markovian Property holds for all the strategies involved in competitive MDPs
mentioned in this study. Details on strategy functions are given in Section 3.2. We slightly
abuse the notation and also use f, g to indicate the two agents in the game.
• States: S is a finite set of NS distinct states (each being a real vector) that can be visited in
the game.
• Actions: Ai = {Ai(s)|s ∈ S}, i = f, g defines the action space for agent f, g. For each state
s ∈ S, Ai(s) is a finite, discrete set containing all the available actions (each being a real vector)
for agent i at state s. If the set of candidate actions is the same at every state (which we assume
for ease of exposition), then we write Ai = {ai(1), ai(2), ..., ai(|Ai|)}, i = f, g to refer to the fixed
available action set for agent i.
• Rewards: R : S → R is reward function for the game. In accordance with the zero-sum nature
of the game, R(s) denotes reward received by agent f while −R(s) for agent g.
• States Transition Probabilities: P : S×Af ×Ag×S → R is the state transition probability
function of the game. If agents f, g take actions af ∈ Af , ag ∈ Ag respectively at state s ∈ S,
then s′ ∈ S is the next visited state with probability P (s′|s, af , ag). Note that in an MDP, the
transition probability depends only on the current state and agents’ actions.
• Discount Factor: γ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor on cumulative reward.
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3.2 Strategies and State Value Functions
In a competitive MDP, the two agents f, g employ Markovian strategies f(af |s), g(ag|s) respectively
to interact with the environment and compete against each other. The Markovian property of strate-
gies states that agents choose actions based only on s, the current state of the game, and all the
other historical information is disregarded. Following the definition of a probability distribution,
f(af |s), g(ag|s) should be non-negative and sum up to 1 over the action space. A pure strategy
means that, for any state s, agents choose only one action deterministically, and the probability dis-
tribution f(af |s) (or g(ag|s) ) is fixed as 0 for all other candidate actions. On the contrary, a mixed
strategy means that distribution f or g can assign a non-zero probability to more than one candidate
actions.
The state value function measures the discounted cumulative return. Given strategy functions
f and g, the state value function (for f) at state s0 is the expected discounted return
vf,g(s0;R) = Eaft∼f(af |st), a
g
t∼g(a
g |st), st+1∼P (s′|st,a
f
t ,a
g
t )
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtR(st)
]
, (1)
while the expected discounted cumulative return for g is −vf,g(s0;R). Since we consider IRL, we show
dependency on R explicitly as R changes in our IRL algorithm.
3.3 Q-Function and Advantage Function for Actions
Aside from the state value function vf,g(s;R), another useful metric is the state-action value function
(namely, Q-function)
Q
f,g
f (s, a;R) = R(s) + γEag∼g(a|s), s′∼P (s′|s,a,ag)
[
vf,g(s′;R)
]
, (2)
Qf,gg (s, a;R) = −R(s) + γEaf∼f(a|s), s′∼P (s′|s,af ,a)
[
− vf,g(s′;R)
]
. (3)
Based on the state value function and Q-function, the advantage function measuring benefits of
actions over current strategies is defined as
A
f,g
f (s, a
f ;R) = Qf,gf (s, a
f ;R)− vf,g(s;R), (4)
Af,gg (s, a
g;R) = Qf,gg (s, a
g;R) + vf,g(s;R). (5)
The advantage functions can be used for characterization of optimal strategies in both single-agent
and multi-agent MDPs.
3.4 Nash Equilibrium in a Zero-Sum Discounted Stochastic Game
To proceed with the discussion, we need a formal definition on optimal strategies in a zero-sum
stochastic game. In both zero-sum and general-sum two-person discounted stochastic games, when
agents are allowed to play mixed Markovian strategies, it can be shown that there exists at least one
pair of strategies (f∗(R), g∗(R)) that is optimal as (f∗(R), g∗(R)) reaches Nash Equilibrium under
reward function R (sometimes the term “optimal strategy” is used instead in the case of zero-sum
discounted stochastic games). In the zero-sum case, a Nash Equilibrium strategy pair (f∗(R), g∗(R))
ensures that, for any s ∈ S and any strategy pair (f, g) we have
vf
∗(R),g(s;R) ≥ vf
∗(R),g∗(R)(s;R) ≥ vf,g
∗(R)(s;R). (6)
Therefore, f∗(R) is a solution to optimization problem
max
f
min
g
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf,g(s;R), (7)
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and g∗(R) is a solution to
min
g
max
f
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf,g(s;R). (8)
As already mentioned above, we can characterize Nash Equilibriums in zero-sum discounted games
using advantage functions. To be specific,
(
f∗(R), g∗(R)
)
is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if for any
s,
A
f∗(R),g∗(R)
f (s, a;R) ≤ 0 for ∀a ∈ A
f , and A
f∗(R),g∗(R)
f (s, a;R) = 0 if f
∗(R)(a|s) > 0;
Af
∗(R),g∗(R)
g (s, a;R) ≤ 0 for ∀a ∈ A
g, and Af
∗(R),g∗(R)
g (s, a;R) = 0 if g
∗(R)(a|s) > 0.
Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium is not guaranteed. Therefore, technically speaking f∗(R) and
g∗(R) are multivalued functions, mapping to a set that contains all Nash Equilibrium strategies. In
(6) the strategy appearing at superscripts is just one candidate from the entire set. Fortunately, this
does not pose extra issues since the value of the game
v∗(s) = max
f
min
g
vf,g(s;R)
is known to be unique for any s ∈ S in a zero-sum discounted stochastic game. Videlicet, in zero-sum
cases all Nash Equilibrium strategy pairs lead to the same state value functions, and (6) always holds.
4 Competitive Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning
with Sub-Optimal Demonstrations
4.1 Inverse Reinforcement Learning Problem
The purpose of our work is to address inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) problems in zero-sum
stochastic games. As defined by Russel in [15], an IRL algorithm relies on the knowledge of
• a model of the environment, i.e., state transition function P (s′|s, af , ag) is known; and
• demonstrations of agents’ behaviors and visited states. An observation set
D = {(si, a
E,f
i , a
E,g
i ) | i = 1, 2, 3, ...., ND}
is available, and shows how some experts have performed in the task. Here si is the visited
state, and aE,fi , a
E,g
i stand for actions taken by the two expert players where we use E to denote
experts.
Note that in D, the next visited state is not required since we already have access to state tran-
sition probabilities. Besides, subscript i does not necessarily stand for time, and each observation
(si, a
E,f
i , a
E,g
i ) can be drawn from different rounds of games so that the i-th observation can be ir-
relevant to the (i − 1)-th or (i + 1)-th observation. Lastly, we do not attempt to model the expert
strategies that have generated aE,fi , a
E,g
i . Instead, we only sample observations in D and compare
their performance with that of optimal strategies.
4.2 Objective Function
The formulation of an IRL problem hinges on the choice of the objective function. As stressed before,
we do not assume the optimality of experts’ demonstrations, but we still assume experts to have
demonstrated performances that are comparable with the best possible strategies in this game. More
specifically, based on inequality (6) we have
vf
∗(R),gE |D (s;R) ≥ vf
∗(R),g∗(R)(s;R) ≥ vf
E |D,g
∗(R)(s;R) for ∀s ∈ S.
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Here R is the reward function we aim to solve for, and fE |D is a policy that concurs with actions a
E,f
i
for each observed state si, i = 1, 2, . . . , ND. More formally,
fE |D(a|s) =
#{(s, a, )}
#{(s, , )}
if #{(s, , )} > 0
where # denotes the count of occurrence in D. For states s with (s, , ) 6∈ D, we remain agnostic
about fE|D. We similarly define g
E |D(a|s) =
#{(s, , a)}
#{(s, , )}
when the denominator is positive.
Meanwhile, we would like margins
Es
[
vf
∗(R),gE |D (s;R)− vf
∗(R),g∗(R)(s;R)
]
, (9)
Es
[
vf
∗(R),g∗(R)(s;R)− vf
E |D,g
∗(R)(s;R)
]
(10)
to be reasonably tight. By summing up the two margins, we yield the optimization problem for our
IRL model
min
R
min
fE |D,gE |D
Es
[
vf
∗(R),gE |D (s;R)− vf
E |D ,g
∗(R)(s;R)
]
(11)
where f∗(R) ∈ argmax
f
min
g
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf,g(s;R),
and g∗(R) ∈ argmin
g
max
f
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf,g(s;R).
Note that the minimization on fE|D, g
E |D in (11) is required since f
E |D, g
E|D are uniquely defined
only on D. The model encourages fE|D and g
E |D outside of D to follow the actions in f
∗(R) and
g∗(R).
4.3 Algorithm
We approach (11) by an iterative algorithm. In each iteration, we find Nash Equilibrium strategy
f∗(R), g∗(R) given current reward function R, then R is updated based on incumbent f∗(R), g∗(R),
which requires the estimation of (9) and (10). Regarding the minimization operation on fE |D, g
E|D
in (11), on states that are not demonstrated in by D the algorithm considers only strategies equal to
the current f∗(R), g∗(R). Furthermore, we consider only fE |D, g
E |D that match with D on a sample
random demonstration, and follow the current f∗(R), g∗(R) otherwise, respectively. In doing so we
avoid the need to deal with minfE |D ,gE |D , and essentially the algorithm updates only the reward
function R and Nash Equilibrium.
As for solving Nash Equilibrium in zero-sum discounted games, the proposed adversarial training
algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 2 and Section 4. Next we focus on the update step on the reward
function with current f∗(R), g∗(R).
Note that (fE |D, g
E |D) poses inconveniences since the expert policy is unknown when a state s
outside of D is visited. Our workaround is to let experts act only at the very first step, and use (f∗, g∗)
for the following states. Such a treatment follows the logic that, by bounding the performance gap
at the first step (equivalent to bounding advantage of actions), we also bound the gap of discounted
cumulative reward for the infinitely many steps.
Specifically, vf
E |D,g
∗(R)(s;R) is estimated by sampling trajectories (s
E,g∗(R)
1 , . . . , s
E,g∗(R)
T ) of a
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fixed length T in the following manner (note that E stands for experts):
(s
E,g∗(R)
0 , a
f
0 , ) ∼ D,
a
g
t ∼ g
∗(R)(a|s
E,g∗(R)
t ) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
a
f
t ∼ f
∗(R)(a|s
E,g∗(R)
t ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T,
and s
E,g∗(R)
t ∼ P (s
′|s
E,g∗(R)
t−1 , a
f
t−1, a
g
t−1) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
(12)
For the estimation of vf
∗(R),gE |D (s;R), trajectories (s
f∗(R),E
1 , s
f∗(R),E
2 , . . . , s
f∗(R),E
T ) are sampled
in a symmetric fashion, where the initial state s
f∗(R),E
0 and initial action for g a
g
0 is sampled from D,
while the other actions and states are generated by f∗(R), g∗(R).
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. We use deep neural networks as model approximations for
policies and reward functions involved in the IRL task. To model the reward function, a deep neural
network RθR(s) is used and parametrized by θR. Similarly, two deep neural nets fθf (a|s), gθg(a|s) are
maintained and updated in the algorithm to approximate f∗(RθR), g
∗(RθR). A regularization term
φ(θR) is added to prevent trivial solutions (R(s) ≡ 0 for instance) and normalize the scale of R(s).
As shown in Algorithm 1, in the policy step at steps 3 and 4, we update θf , θg under the current
RθR and try to find a Nash Equilibrium. Every KR iterations, we check the performance of Nash
Equilibrium policies in step 6. (The estimation of vˆf
best,g
, vˆf,g
best
is detailed in Section 5.) To ensure
a good approximation of optimal policies under the incumbent reward function, the policy step is
performed much more frequently than the reward step, and we update θR only when we believe fθf
and gθg approximate f
∗(RθR), g
∗(RθR) well enough. When the current fθf , gθg are accurate enough
compared against a threshold τ , we perform IR times a reward step that minimizes the performance
gap between f∗(R), gE |D and f
E |D, g
∗(R) with regularization term φ(θR) based on trajectories gen-
erated as described in (12). Note that the policy step is performed at each iteration, and the only
difference between each policy step is that different trajectories are sampled and used to update the
Nash Equilibrium policy under current RθR .
Algorithm 1 Inverse Reinforcement Learning in Zero-Sum Discounted Stochastic Games
Require:
Observed experts demonstrations D = {(si, a
f
i , a
g
i ) | i = 1, 2, . . . , ND};
Positive integers KR, IR; Nash Equilibrium threshold τ ; learning rate λ.
Initialize: Parameters θR for the reward function, and θf , θg to parametrize fθf (a|s), gθg (a|s) for Nash Equilibrium
policies
1: for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . do ⊲ policy step
2: Update θf to find Nash Equilibrium strategy for f under current RθR , return also vˆ
f,gbest
3: Update θg to find Nash Equilibrium strategy for g under current RθR , return also vˆ
fbest,g
4: if i % KR = 0 then
5: if vˆf
best,g − vˆf,g
best
< τ then ⊲ check performances of Nash Equilibrium policies
6: for j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , IR do ⊲ reward step
7: Sample one observation from D: (s, aE,f , aE,g)
8: Use (12) to obtain {s
f∗(RθR
),E
1 , s
f∗(RθR
),E
2 , . . . , s
f∗(RθR
),E
T }, {s
E,g∗(RθR
)
1 , s
E,g∗(RθR
)
2 , . . . , s
E,g∗(RθR
)
T }
9: vˆf (θ¯R)← R ¯θR (s) +
∑T
t=1 γ
t−1Rθ¯R
(
s
f∗(RθR
),E
t
)
10: vˆg(θ¯R)← Rθ¯R (s) +
∑T
t=1 γ
t−1R ¯θR
(
s
E,g∗(RθR
)
t
)
11: θR ← θR − λ∇ ¯θR
(
vˆf (θ¯R)− vˆ
g(θ¯R) + φ(θ¯R)
)
|θ¯R=θR
8
5 Solving Nash Equilibrium in Zero-Sum Discounted Stochas-
tic Games
5.1 Algorithm
In order to find Nash Equilibrium in zero-sum stochastic games, we adopt the framework of generative
adversarial network in [7], and propose an algorithm that is used in the policy step in Algorithm 1 at
steps 3 and 4. The algorithm finds a Nash equilibrium strategy for only one agent. We present the
algorithm for solving f∗(R), and g∗(R) can be solved in a similar fashion. In the remainder of this
section, we omit the dependency on R, which is fixed in the policy step.
The definition of Nash Equilibrium in (6) in zero-sum discounted games naturally suggests adver-
sarial training as a solution methodology. Based on (6), we first identify the best response g to current
f , and then update f marginally to compete against the best response g. We repeat these two steps
until f∗ has been reached.
Two deep neural networks fθf (s) and gθg(s) are used, parametrized by θf and θg respectively. Both
networks take state vector s ∈ S as input, which is completely public to both sides. Each network
outputs a probability distribution over action space, namely
fθf (s) =
(
fθf (a
f (1) | s), fθf (a
f (2) | s), . . . , fθf (a
f (|Af |) | s)
)
,
gθg(s) =
(
gθg(a
g(1) | s), gθg(a
g(2) | s), . . . , gθg(a
g(|Ag |) | s)
)
.
Agents then sample actions from the probability distribution and act accordingly.
As for policy gradient methods used in our algorithm, we choose the actor-critic style Proximal
Policy Optimization algorithm (PPO) from [1] because of its superior and stable performances. To
perform actor-critic style PPO, a state value model is required and we denote it as vf,gθv (s). Again,
v
f,g
θv
(s) is a deep neural network that takes state vector s as input, and outputs a scalar as the
estimation for state value defined in (1).
The online training on f and g relies on T -step trajectories of the game. From a randomly
initialized s0, we run the agents for T consecutive steps to obtain a trajectory as an ordered tuple(
s0, s1, . . . , sT−1, sT
)
.
At each state st, a
f
t , a
g
t are the actions taken by f, g based on the incumbent policy parameters, Rt is
the immediate reward received by f at step t, and st+1 is the next state visited by agents after their
actions.
Similar to [1], a set of target networks is maintained for generating trajectories, while the training
step based on observed trajectories updates the original networks. Parameters for target networks
are denoted as (θtargetf , θ
target
g , θ
target
v,f , θ
target
v,g ). After every Krefresh iterations, they are periodically
refreshed by (θf , θg, θv,f , θv,g) we are training. Estimation of advantage for f at each step is
Aˆ
f
t = δ
f
t + (γλ)δ
f
t+1 + ...+ (γλ)
T−t−1δ
f
T−1 for t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1,
δ
f
t = Rt + γv
f,g
θ
target
v,f
(st+1)− v
f,g
θ
target
v,f (st)
,
and the clipped loss in PPO for f is
Lf,CLIP(θf ) = −
∑
t
min
(
r
f
t (θf )Aˆ
f
t , (1 − ǫ)Aˆ
f
t , (1 + ǫ)Aˆ
f
t
)
,
r
f
t (θf ) =
fθf (a
f
t |st)
fθtargetf
(aft |st)
.
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Similarly, we formulate the clipped loss for g as
Aˆ
g
t = δ
g
t + (γλ)δ
g
t+1 + ...+ (γλ)
T−t−1δ
g
T−1 for t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1,
δ
g
t = −Rt + γv
f,g
θ
target
v,g
(st+1)− v
f,g
θ
target
v,g
(st),
Lg,CLIP(θg) = −
∑
t
min
(
r
g
t (θf )Aˆ
g
t , (1− ǫ)Aˆ
g
t , (1 + ǫ)Aˆ
g
t
)
,
r
g
t (θg) =
gθg(a
g
t |st)
gθtargetg (a
g
t |st)
.
The loss for updating θv,f , θv,g is
Lv(θv,f , θv,g) =
∑
t
[
(vf,gθv,f (st)− v
f,target
t )
2 + (vf,gθv,g (st)− v
g,target
t )
2
]
,
v
f,target
t = v
f,g
θ
target
v,f
(st) + Aˆ
f
t , v
g,target
t = v
f,g
θ
target
v,g
(st) + Aˆ
g
t .
Lastly, as requested in step 6 in Algorithm 1, periodically we need to estimate the performance
of fθf when competing against its best adversarial gθg . Each time, we sample a batch of 64 T -step
trajectories T , and calculate the average of discounted cumulative return on these trajectories to yield
vˆf,g
best
=
1
|T |
∑
(s0,s1,...,sT−1,sT )∈T
T∑
t=0
γtR(st). (13)
The full algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. As we have mentioned, the proposed algorithm is
similar to GAN since g is updated at most of the iterations while in every Kcycle iterations only a
small proportion of them are meant for f step. Though we do not show this in the algorithm, we
recommend the use of a batch of agents running in parallel for collecting gradients (as in [1]). Lastly,
we reiterate that Algorithm 2 is meant for finding f∗(R). The training for g∗ is conducted separately
in a similar fashion, and we estimate vˆfbest,g similarly as in (13).
Algorithm 2 Adversarial Training Algorithm for Solving f∗(R) in Zero-Sum Games
Require:
Integers Kg,Kcycle,Krefresh; learning rates λg , λf ; horizon length T .
1: Initialize: Parameters θf , θg for policy models and θv for state value model.
2: Set θtargetf ← θf , θ
target
g ← θg, and θ
target
v ← θv .
3: for i = 1, 2, 3, .... do
4: Randomly initialize the starting state s0.
5: From initial state s0, run fθtarget
f
(a|s), g
θ
target
g
(a|s) for T steps
6: Calculate estimated advantages for player f and g: Aˆ
f/g
0 , Aˆ
f/g
1 , ..., Aˆ
f/g
T−1.
7: if i % Kcycle ≤ Kg then ⊲ g step
8: θg ← θg − λg∇θL
g,CLIP(θ)|θ=θg
9: θv,f ← θv,f − λf∇θL
v(θ, θ′)|θ=θv,f ,θ′=θv,g
10: θv,g ← θv,g − λg∇θ′L
v(θ, θ′)|θ=θv,f ,θ′=θv,g
11: else ⊲ f step
12: θf ← θf − λf∇θL
f,CLIP(θ)|θ=θf
13: if i % Krefresh = 0 then ⊲ refresh target networks
14: Set θf ← θ
target
f , θg ← θ
target
g , θv,f ← θ
target
v,f , and θv,g ← θ
target
v,g .
5.2 Analysis
For solving Nash Equilibrium in zero-sum discounted stochastic games, we train an agent to always
compete against its best possible opponent. We can think of the training process under objective
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function (3) as performing gradient ascent for
F (f) = min
g
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf,g(s).
In this section, we consider the case as if we use a tabular approach for each agent’s policy instead
of using model approximations. The tabular approach means that for any s and any af , ag, f(af |s) or
g(ag|s) would be variables, and the only constraints are standard probability requirements. We show
that using (7) (or (8)) as the objective function to solve for f∗ (or g∗) is theoretically a sound choice,
because there is no local maximum in F (f).
Proposition 1: Function F (f) has no local maxima. Namely, if at a certain f˜ there exists no
feasible strictly ascent direction for F (f˜), then
F (f˜) = max
f
F (f) s.t. f(s) ≥ 0,fTs 1 = 1 ∀s ∈ S.
Proof. Without loss of generality we can assume that there exists a state s0 under which both agents
receive zero rewards, and regardless of the actions the agents take, any s ∈ S has the same probability
to be visited at the next step. Formally,
R(s0) = 0,
p(s′|s0, a
f , ag) =
1
Ns
for ∀s′ ∈ S, ∀af ∈ Af , ∀a
g ∈ Ag. (14)
Given policies f, g and the discount factor γ ∈ (0, 1), we have vf,g(s0) =
1
γNs
∑
s∈S v
f,g(s). Therefore,
F (f) =
1
γ
min
g
vf,g(s0).
We hereby use this artificial starting state s0 to simplify the notation. The conclusions below are
adapted to the multi-agent setting in our case from the reinforcement learning perspective.
The policy gradient theorem (a variant of (13.5) in [16]) where the agents employ policies f and
g, the starting state is s0, and policy f is a function fθ parametrized by θ reads
∇θv
f,g
f (s0) =
∑
s
df,g(s)
∑
af
Q
f,g
f (s, a
f )∇θf(a
f |s)
=
∑
s
df,g(s)
∑
af
A
f,g
f (s, a
f )∇θf(a
f |s) +
∑
s
df,g(s)
∑
af
vf,g(s)∇θf(a
f |s)
=
∑
s
df,g(s)
∑
af
A
f,g
f (s, a
f )∇θf(a
f |s).
Note that the last equality holds because
∑
af f(a|s) = 1 implies that
∑
af ∇θf(a
f |s) = 0. Here df,g(s)
is the expected frequency of encountering state s discounted by γ. In other words, the performance
of the agent is differentiable, and the current advantage function can be used to characterize the
gradient. Particularly, under the tabular representation, a policy at each state s is
fs = (fs,1, fs,2, . . . , fs,|Af |−1, 1−
|Af |−1∑
i=1
fs,i)
where the parameter θ for policy model f are variables fs,1, fs,2, . . . , fs,|Af |−1 at s ∈ S. Therefore, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , |Af |,
∂vf,g(s0)
∂fs,i
= df,g(s)
(
A
f,g
f
(
s, af (i)
)
−Af,gf
(
s, af (|Af |)
))
.
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Due to (14), we know that there is a positive probability to visit any s ∈ S when starting from s0.
Therefore,
df,g(s) > 0 for s ∈ S. (15)
Based on optimality condition (3.17) in [16] when competing against a policy f , for optimal policy
g∗ satisfies
vf,g
∗
(s) = −max
ag
Qf,g
∗
g (s, a
g),
Qf,g
∗
g (s, a
g) =
∑
s′∈S,af∼f(a|s)
p(s′|s, af , ag)
[
−R(s) + γmax
a′g
Qf,g
∗
g (s
′, a′g)
]
,
for any s ∈ S. Similarly, when playing against a policy g, optimal policy f∗ satisfies
vf
∗,g(s) = max
af
Q
f∗,g
f (s, a
f ),
Q
f∗,g
f (s, a
f ) =
∑
s′∈S,ag∼g(a|s)
p(s′|s, af , ag)
[
R(s) + γmax
a′f
Q
f∗,g
f (s
′, a′f )
]
,
for any s ∈ S.
The policy improvement theorem (inequalities (4.7) and (4.8) in [16]) when playing against a
certain policy g, for two policies f and f ′, states that if
vf,g(s) ≤ Qf,gf (s, f
′(a|s)) , Eaf∼f ′(a|s)Q
f,g
f (s, a
f )
holds for any state s, then
vf
′,g(s) ≥ vf,g(s) for s ∈ S.
Similarly, if
vf,g(s) ≥ Qf,gg (s, g
′(a|s)) , Eag∼g′(a|s)Q
f,g
g (s, a
g)
holds for any state s, then
vf,g
′
(s) ≤ vf,g(s) for s ∈ S.
Although the policy improvement theorem was initially established for pure policies, the line of
logic in its proof also holds for mixed policies.
Let us define set gP to be the set containing any possible pure policy for agent g. Then it is clear
that
min
g
vf,g(s0) = min
g∈gP
vf,g(s0).
We now switch to the main part of the proof, which includes a few claims listed below.
For a given f , we consider the performance of g on the set gP . We evaluate v
f,g(s0) for every
g ∈ gP , which yields the set
{
vf,gP1 (s0), v
f,gP2 (s2), . . . , v
f,gPK (s0)
}
of distinct values. We rank those
values in the ascending order to get an ordered set
{
v(1)(f), v(2)(f), . . .
}
.
Here v(1)(f) = ming∈gP v
f,g(s0), v
(2)(f) is the second smallest value, and so on. We have
δ(f) = v(2)(f)− v(1)(f) > 0 (16)
which is a strictly positive gap between the first and second smallest performance on set gP . We also
define the best response set
gbestP (f) = {g ∈ gP | v
f,g(s0) = v
(1)(f)}.
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Claim 1: For a policy vector f = (fTs1 ,f
T
s2
, . . . ,fTsNs )
T where fsi ∈ R
|Af | is the policy vector at
state si, a vector ∆f = (∆f,1,∆f,2, . . . ,∆f,si)
T where ∆f,i ∈ R
|Af | and ∆Tf,i1 = 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , Ns,
and an ǫ1 > 0 such that
f + ǫ1∆f ≥ 0, (17)
we have
gbestP (f + ǫ∆f) ⊆ g
best
P (f)
for any ǫ > 0 small enough.
Proof. Because of the policy gradient theorem and the fact that R is bounded due to the finite state
space S, there exists M > 0 such that
∣∣∣∂vf˜ ,g˜(s0)
∂f˜s,i
∣∣∣ < M ∀f˜ , g˜, s ∈ S, i = 1, 2, . . . , |Af | − 1.
By the assumption (17) of the claim, there exists a small enough ǫ2 > 0 such that for 0 < ǫ <
min(ǫ1, ǫ2,
δ(f)
2M ), we have 0 ≤ f + ǫ∆f ≤ 1 (so it is still a well-defined policy) and, by the definition
of the derivative and the definition of M , for any g ∈ gP we have
∣∣vf+ǫ∆f ,g(s0)− vf ,g(s0)∣∣ < δ(f)
2
.
Thus, for every g ∈ gbestP (f), since v
(1)(f) = vf,g(s0), we have
vf+ǫ∆f ,g(s0) < v
(1)(f) +
δ(f)
2
.
And for every g˜ ∈ gP \ g
best
P (f), we have
vf+ǫ∆f ,g˜(s0) > v
(2)(f)−
δ(f)
2
= v(1)(f) +
δ(f)
2
.
Therefore, for every g ∈ gbestP (f), we have g˜ 6∈ argming v
f+ǫ∆f ,g(s0), which implies that given the
feasible direction ∆f for policy f with a corresponding ǫ1 > 0, for any small enough ǫ > 0 we have
gbestP (f + ǫ∆f ) ⊆ g
best
P (f). (18)
This shows the claim.
Claim 2: Let f be a local maximum for F . Then for any s ∈ S, the linear system
∆TAs > 0
fs +∆ ≥ 0
(fs +∆)
T1 = 1
(19)
is infeasible with ∆ ∈ R|Af | as variables, where the advantage matrix is
As =
(
A
f,gPj
(
s, af (i)
))
i,j
with gPj ∈ g
best
P (f) for j = 1, 2, . . . , |g
best
P (f)|.
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Proof. We show the statement by contradiction. Let us assume the existence of a state s ∈ S for
which the linear system (19) is feasible with ∆ = (∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆|Af |)
T ∈ R|Af |. This implies that
the conditions of Claim 1 are met and thus gbestP (f + ǫ∆f ) ⊆ g
best
P (f) for any small enough ǫ > 0.
Here ∆f = (0
T ,0T , . . . ,∆T , . . . ,0T )T with ∆ being at the position corresponding to state s. Due to
fTs 1 = 1, it is also obvious that ∆
T1 = 0 and we have
∆|Af | = −
|Af |−1∑
i=1
∆i.
Observe that each row of As corresponds to an action in Af , and each column of As corre-
sponds to a optimal pure policy for g when playing against the given f . This suggests that for
j = 1, 2, . . . , |gbestP (f)| we have,
|Af |−1∑
i=1
∆i
(
A
f,gPj
(
s, af (i)
)
−Af,gPj
(
s, af (|Af |)
))
> 0.
By the policy gradient theorem, for j = 1, 2, . . . , |gbestP (f)| we have
|Af |−1∑
i=1
∂v
f,gPj (s0)
fs,i
∆i
= df,gPj (s)
|Af |−1∑
i=1
∆i
(
A
f,gPj
(
s, af (i)
)
−Af,gPj
(
s, af (|Af |)
))
> 0. (20)
The last inequality holds strictly since we have already argued that df,g(s) > 0 for every s, f, g when
the starting point is the artificial state s0. Inequality (20) shows that for any g ∈ g
best
P (f), the
directional gradient for v is strictly positive along ∆.
Therefore, there exists ǫ3 > 0 such that for 0 < ǫ < ǫ3 we have,
v
fs+ǫ∆,gPj (s0) > v
f,gPj (s0) for j = 1, 2, . . . , |g
best
P (f)|. (21)
Given Claim 1 and (21), we know that if at a certain state s there exists a vector ∆ feasible to
(19), then there exists ǫ˜ > 0 such that for any 0 < ǫ < ǫ˜ we have,
F (fs + ǫ∆) =
1
γ
min
g∈gP
vfs+ǫ∆,g(s0)
=
1
γ
min
g∈gbestP (fs+ǫ∆)
vfs+ǫ∆,g(s0)
≥
1
γ
min
g∈gbestP (f)
vfs+ǫ∆,g(s0) (due to (18))
>
1
γ
min
g∈gbestP (f)
vf,g(s0) (due to (21))
= F (f).
We conclude that f can not be a local maximum of F (f) as long as there exists a state s such
that (19) is feasible.
Claim 3: If f is a local maximum for F , then for every state s there exists a vector ws such that
∆TAsws ≤ 0,ws ≥ 0,w
T
s 1 = 1,
for any vector ∆ that makes fs +∆ a well-defined policy at state s.
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Proof. First, we reorder the actions of f so that the one with the highest probability at state s is the
last one in fs. Then, consider
∆˜T A˜s > 0
∆˜i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Cs
(22)
where index set Cs = {i ≤ |Af | − 1 | fs,i = 0}, vector ∆˜ ∈ R
|Af |−1, and
A˜s =
(
ATs,1 −A
T
s,|Af |
,ATs,2 −A
T
s,|Af |
, . . . ,ATs,|Af |−1 −A
T
s,|Af |
)T
with As,i being the i-th row vector of As.
By Claim 2, we know that (19) is infeasible. We now argue that if (19) is infeasible, so is (22). Let
us assume that (22) has a solution ∆˜. Then there exists a small enough ǫ > 0 such that fs,i+ ǫ∆˜i ≥ 0
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , |Af |−1. This is true since fs,i = 0, ∆˜i ≥ 0 holds for every i ∈ Cs, and for i 6∈ Cs we
have fs,i > 0 and thus the inequality holds for small enough ǫ > 0. We denote one such appropriate
value as ǫ1. Finally, if we let ∆ = (∆˜
T ,−∆˜T1)T , then we clearly have ∆T1 = 0, and fs + ǫ∆ ≥ 0 for
any ǫ with
0 < ǫ < ǫ2 = min
(
ǫ1,max(0,
fs,|Af |
∆˜T1
)
)
.
Since fs,|Af | > 0, we have ǫ2 > 0. It is also easy to check that
∆TAs = ǫ∆˜
T A˜s > 0.
We therefore conclude that if f is a local maximum, then (22) is infeasible.
In (22), except for the strict inequality let us denote all other constraints as B∆˜ ≥ 0. Note that
B is disposed with 0,1 on the diagonal. By the theorem of alternatives, infeasibility of (22) implies
that there exist y ≥ 0, z ≥ 0 so that
A˜sy +B
T z = 0 and y 6= 0.
After rescaling y, there exist k > 0 and column vector ws ≥ 0 with w
T
s 1 = 1 such that
A˜sws = −kB
Tz.
Then, due to B∆˜ ≥ 0 and Bu,v = 0 for u 6∈ Cs, v 6∈ Cs, for any ∆˜ with ∆˜i ≥ 0 for i ∈ Cs, we have
∆˜T A˜sws = −k∆˜
TBTz ≤ 0. (23)
We define a new vector ∆ such that fs+∆ ≥ 0,∆
T1 = 0. Note that these are equivalent to saying
that fs +∆ is a policy. We have ∆i ≥ 0 for i ∈ Cs and ∆|Af | = −
∑|Af |−1
i=1 ∆i. If we let
∆˜ = (∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆|Af |−1)
T ,
then we have
∆˜T A˜sws = (∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆|Af |−1)
(
ATs,1 −A
T
s,|Af |
,ATs,2 −A
T
s,|Af |
, . . . ,ATs,|Af |−1 −A
T
s,|Af |
)T
ws
=
( |Af |−1∑
i=1
∆iAs,i −
|Af |−1∑
i=1
∆iAs,|Af |
)
ws
= (∆1,∆2, . . . ,∆|Af |−1,−
|Af |−1∑
i=1
∆i)
(
ATs,1,A
T
s,2, . . . ,A
T
s,|Af |
)T
ws
= ∆TAsws.
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Together with (23), we thus have
∆TAsws ≤ 0, (24)
which shows the claim.
Let f be a local maximum of F . Treating ws defined in Claim 3 as coefficients for a convex com-
bination of opponent’s policies in set gbestP (f) = {g
f,1
P , g
f,2
P , . . . , g
f,|gbestP (f)|
P } (namely, the probability
that the agent plays the gf,jP at state s is equal to the j-th element of ws), we obtain a mixed policy
g˜ws at state s for the opponent agent g, the advantage function of which is A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
=
(
Asws
)
i
for action af (i). Regarding this advantage function, we establish that
vf,g˜
w
s (s) =
|Af |∑
i=1
fs,i Q
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
for s ∈ S, implies that
0 =
|Af |∑
i=1
fs,i
(
Q
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
− vf,g˜
w
s (s)
)
for s ∈ S, and thus
0 =
|Af |∑
i=1
fs,i A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
for s ∈ S, and
0 =
∑
1≤i≤|Af |,i6∈Cs
fs,i A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
for s ∈ S. (25)
Since fs is a well-defined distribution, the set C
c
s = {i ∈ N | 1 ≤ i ≤ |Af |, fs,i > 0} is non-empty.
With (25) and fs ≥ 0, we see that there exist j1, j2 ∈ C
c
s (j1 and j2 can be identical) such that
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (j1)
)
≤ 0, fs,j1 > 0, (26)
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (j2)
)
≥ 0, fs,j2 > 0. (27)
Claim 4: We have
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af(i)
)
≤ 0 for ∀ af (i). (28)
Proof. If (28) does not hold, then there exists an index i1 such that A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i1)
)
=
(
Asws
)
i1
> 0.
Let ∆1 be the vector defined as
∆1l =


1 if l = i1
−1 if l = j1
0 otherwise.
(Note that fs,i1 < 1, since otherwise, C
c
s contains only i1, and (25) implies A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i1)
)
= 0. )
Meanwhile, given (26) we have fs,j1 > 0. Therefore, there exists a 0 < ǫ(1) < min(1− fs,i1 , fs,j1)
such that
0 ≤ fs + ǫ(1)∆
1
=
(
fs,1, fs,2, . . . , fs,i1 + ǫ(1), . . . , fs,j1 − ǫ(1), . . . , fs,|Af |
)
≤ 1,
and
ǫ(1)(∆
1)TAsws = ǫ(1)
(
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i1)
)
−A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (j1)
))
> 0,
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which contradicts Claim 3. Therefore, such i1 does not exist, and advantage for any action a
f (i) is
non-positive.
Claim 5: We have
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
= 0 for ∀ af (i) with fs,i > 0. (29)
Proof. If (29) does not hold, then there exists an index i2 such that A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i2)
)
=
(
Asws
)
i2
< 0
and fs,i2 > 0. Let ∆
2 be the vector defined as
∆2l =


−1 if l = i2
1 if l = j2
0 otherwise.
(Note that fs,j2 < 1 because we already have fs,i2 > 0.) Therefore, there exists a 0 < ǫ(2) <
min(1 − fs,j2 , fs,i2) such that
0 ≤ fs + ǫ(2)∆
2
=
(
fs,1, fs,2, . . . , fs,i2 − ǫ(2), . . . , fs,j2 + ǫ(2), . . . , fs,|Af |
)
≤ 1,
and
ǫ(2)(∆
2)TAsws = ǫ(2)
(
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (j2)
)
−A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i2)
))
> 0,
which contradicts Claim 3. Therefore, such i2 does not exist, and advantage is zero for any action
af (i) with fs,i > 0.
In summary, the claims show that when policy f is a local maximum, we obtain a mixed policy g˜ws
for any state s. We denote the entire policy function as g˜w. Obviously, g˜w only plays optimal actions
against f and is also a best response to f . Meanwhile, under this policy g˜w, due to (28) and (29), at
any state s we have
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
≤ 0 for i = 1, 2, . . . , |Af |,
A
f,g˜ws
f
(
s, af (i)
)
= 0 if fs,i > 0.
Therefore, f is also the best response to g˜w as prescribed by the Bellman optimality condition
vf,g˜
w
(s) = max
af∈Af
Q
f,g˜w
f (s, a
f ) s ∈ S.
We use this to show that f is the global maximum of function F . Since f is the best response to
g˜w, for any policy f˜ , under g˜w we see that
vf,g˜
w
(s) = max
af∈Af
Q
f,g˜w
f (s, a
f )
≥ Eaf∼f˜(a|s)Q
f,g˜w
f (s, a
f )
= Qf,g˜
w
f (s, f˜(a|s))
holds for any state s. By the policy improvement theorem, we thus have
vf,g˜
w
(s) ≥ vf˜ ,g˜
w
(s) for ∀s.
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Since g˜w is a best response to f , we know that
F (f) =
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf˜ ,g˜
w
(s).
Therefore,
F (f˜) ≤
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf˜ ,g˜
w
(s) ≤
1
Ns
∑
s∈S
vf,g˜
w
(s) = F (f).
This concludes the proof.
6 Experimental Study
In this section, we illustrate the proposed IRL and Nash Equilibrium algorithms on a zero-sum stochas-
tic game and present their performances. First, we introduce the zero-sum stochastic game we use in
our experiments, and discuss the complexity and scale of the game. Next, we demonstrate the quality
of the reward function and Nash Equilibrium policies solved by our IRL algorithm when we are given
only expert demonstrations, after which we show the performance of our Nash Equilibrium algorithm
when the reward function is available.
6.1 The Chasing Game on Gridworld
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
3
4
f1
f2
g1
g2
−− − − − − − →↓
max
j
 min
i
 di, j=5
Figure 1: Grid of the chasing game. We use circles to represent the predators and crosses for the
preys. In this example, the distance from g1 to predators is mini di,1 = 5, while the distance from g2
to predators is 3, so the distance between f2 and g1 determines the immediate reward at this state,
and Rchasing(s) = −5.
Games on a grid have been widely used in reinforcement learning research works. In this type of
games, each agent occupies one of the cells and is allowed to move to one of the neighboring cells at
each step. The goal of each agent is to navigate itself to its own advantageous states, and the optimal
policy depends on the relationship between the reward and location of all the agents. For instance,
Abbeel & Ng [4] test their single-agent IRL algorithm on a gridworld game where a small proportion
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of the cells have a positive reward. Reddy et al. [9] devise two-agent games on a small 3×3 grid where
two sets of decoupled reward functions are received by the two agents respectively, driving them to
avoid certain cells and move to their own rewarding cells. Lin et al. [10] simulate 1 vs 1 soccer games
on 4× 5 or 5× 5 grids where the chance of scoring, which is the reward of the game, is determined by
the distance between the offensive player and the defensive player as well as the distance to the goal
area. For the “stick-together game” used by Prasad et al. [13] the reward of each state also hinges on
the distance between the two agents. We name the game chosen for our experiments as the “chasing
game” because we flip the sign of the reward function in the stick-together game and translate the
purely cooperative stick-together game into its purely competitive counterpart. Besides, we extend
the 1 vs 1 game to a 2 vs 2 version, which significantly increases the complexity of the game.
As shown in Fig. 1, this zero-sum stochastic game is played on a 5×5 grid. One team of predators
(agent f) and another team of preys (agent g) participate in the game with two players (denoted as
f1, f2 and g1, g2 respectively) in each team. For the remainder of the paper, we use circles to represent
the predators and crosses for the preys in the figures, and we set the discount factor γ as 0.9. At each
state, any predator or prey occupies one of the cells in the grid, and each cell can contain more than
one player. In terms of available actions, each player is allowed to move upward, downward, leftward,
rightward, or stay, and each action is deterministically executed. At the boundary the player must
stay put. At each step, the agent f or g simultaneously controls the two predators or preys on each
team, so the game is considered to have Ns = 25
4 = 390, 625 states with |A| = 52 = 25 actions
for each agent to choose from at each state. As suggested by the name of the game, the immediate
return at a given state is dictated by the distances between the predators and the preys, driving the
predators to pursue the preys and the preys to stay away from the predators. More formally, the
distance between any predator/prey pair (fi,gj with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2) is
di,j =
∣∣xfi − xgj ∣∣+ ∣∣yfi − ygj ∣∣,
namely the L1-norm distance where state s = (xf1 , yf1 , xf2 , yf2 , xg1 , yg1 , xg2 , yg2) is the coordinate
vector of both agents. Based on this pairwise distance, the immediate reward for the predators (f) is
Rchasing(s) = −D(s), (30)
D(s) = max
j=1,2
min
i=1,2
di,j , (31)
and for the preys it is −Rchasing(s) = D(s). In other words, the immediate reward is determined by
the prey that stays the farthest from all predators. This reward function encourages cooperation and
accurate allocation of tasks within a team and adds an extra layer of complexity to the game. For
example, two predators chasing the same prey would result in a low return for f as the other prey
could conveniently run away, while the two preys that try to hide at the same corner make themselves
easier to be approached simultaneously.
In our setting there is no terminal state or “capture” action in the game. Therefore, even if a
predator and a prey encounter each other at the same cell, the prey will not be removed from the
grid, and the game will just proceed normally. Note that even though we use sampled trajectories of
fixed length for our algorithms, theoretically speaking each round of the game can proceed infinitely
long.
The scale of the game renders previous multi-agent IRL algorithms inefficient. Algorithms such as
[4] and [10] are formulated under the assumption that demonstrated policies are optimal, and rely on
the tabular representation of the game. When using [4] and [10] to solve the chasing game we have just
introduced, one has to either deal with a quadratic programming problem with approximately 4 · 105
variables and 2 · 107 constraints, or to solve a quadratic programming problem with approximately
107 variables at each iteration. In the following sections we demonstrate that our algorithms address
this game with deep neural networks as model approximations and are able to yield good results.
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Figure 2: Results of IRL training. (a) The IRL loss function, which is an estimation of objective
function (11) based on sampled trajectories, is decreasing during training. This trend indicates that
RθR gradually learns to explain the expert demonstrations in our training. (b) Performances of
Nash Equilibrium policy models and their best response models during training. For the majority
of the iterations, the gap of performances between fθf , gθg and the best response opponent models
is marginal, suggesting that fθf , gθg are close enough to Nash Equilibrium policies f
∗(RθR), g
∗(RθR)
during IRL training. (c) The recovered reward function RθR(s) demonstrates a strong correlation
to Rchasing(s) (p < .001). The two scales are different as reward functions are identical up to a
scaling factor. (d) KL-divergence between fθf (or gθg) and f
∗(Rchasing)(or g
∗(Rchasing)). “Early”
denotes the models at the 20,000-th iteration, while “random” model follows a uniform distribution
on all the 5 available actions. The final results of IRL training are as expected most similar to Nash
Equilibrium policies. Error bars indicate the standard errors estimated on a batch of 64 samples. (e)
Performance of policy models under Rchasing. The dashed reference line represents the performance of
the Nash Equilibrium model. Policies recovered by IRL training play similarly well when compared
with the Nash Equilibrium policy, while “early” and “random” models exhibit much more significant
performance gaps. Error bars indicate the standard deviation estimated on a batch of 64 samples.
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6.2 IRL Algorithm
In this section, we use the word “iteration” to refer to i in Algorithm 1. In order to test our IRL
algorithm, we use the chasing game in the setting where the immediate reward is unknown but a set
of expert demonstrations is available. Details of Nash Equilibrium training are covered in Section 6.3.
The sub-optimal demonstration set D is generated as follows. First, under the real reward function
Rchasing(s), we use Algorithm 2 to yield Nash Equilibrium policies approximated by deep neural nets.
Then we let the obtained f∗(Rchasing), g
∗(Rchasing) to act in an ǫ-greedy fashion. To be specific, we
set ǫ = .1 by default so that for each of the 4 players, there is 10% chance that it would (1) deflect
the action sampled from f∗(Rchasing), g
∗(Rchasing) by 90
◦ or −90◦ if the action is not “stay,” or (2)
randomly sample one of the 4 remaining actions if the action is “stay,” and 90% chance it would take
the original action. We thus denote the set of the demonstrated policies as Dǫ=.1. The set consists
of 64 × 500 = 32, 000 trajectories with the length of 10 steps. We believe 500 batches of trajectories
are adequate since the count of states in Dǫ=.1 is 64 × 500 × 10 = 320, 000 and is comparable to
Ns = 390, 625.
Aside from the Dǫ=.1 set, we similarly generate two other sets Dǫ=.05,Dǫ=.2 so that we are able
to compare the performance of the IRL algorithm under demonstration sets of various quality. Note
that ǫ = .2 is considered as large enough since the chance that none of the 4 players would take a
deflected action is only (1− 0.2)4 = 0.4096.
Next we describe the specifications of our models and the algorithm. The actor-critic style PPO
in Algorithm 2 requires both policy models and state value function models. For both models, we
use deep neural nets with a 2-layer 256-neuron structure using rectified linear units [17] as activation
functions, after which a softmax layer outputs a probability distribution on the action space in policy
models (or a linear transformation layer outputs an estimated vˆ(s) in state value models). Moreover,
with the natural state vector s (coordinates of players) we augment another vector s′ which contains
xfi−xgj and yfi−ygj for any pair (i, j) with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2 (therefore, there are 8 elements in s
′). We use
the concatenated vector (s, s′) as the state vector. Empirically, we find that with this tailored input
vector the models converge to Nash Equilibrium faster without significantly increasing the complexity
of the neural networks. For results presented below we use this augmented state vector for all the
models including RθR(s). For the reward function RθR(s) we use a 2-layer 256-neuron structure with
rectified linear units as activation functions, which is followed by a linear transformation layer that
outputs a scalar as the immediate reward for state s.
In terms of the training procedure, we set KR = 1000, IR = 20, and τ = 3. The learning rate
for the reward function is 2.5 · 10−5, T is set as 50, and Adam [19] is used as optimizer. At each
iteration, a batch of 64 different observations are sampled simultaneously from D, and each of the
observation provides a gradient calculated in step 11 in Algorithm 1, after which the batch of gradients
are averaged to update θR.
Lastly, we discuss how the regularization function φ is constructed in our experiment. In [10], Lin
et al. show that the regularization term plays an important role in IRL training. This is natural since
different regularizations reflect different prior knowledge about the game, and thus limit the candidates
of possible reward functions to a family. In our work, we adapt their concept of the “strong covariance”
prior to our tasks. We assume the existence of prior knowledge that the reward is related to the the
distance between the predators and the preys, but it is not known that the max-min distance D(s)
defined in (31) determines R(s). Instead, we simply assume a negative covariance between RθR(s)
and the averaged distance
D¯(s) =
1
4
∑
i
∑
j
di,j .
Besides, to prevent the reward function from drifting too much during training, we incentivize the
expected value of R(s) to be close to 0 throughout training. To prevent the scale of the reward
function from collapsing to 0, we incentivize the variance of R(s) on the entire state space S to be
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close to a given value ρ. These assumptions lead to the regularization function
φ(θR) = c
(
Es∈Dcov(RθR(s), D¯(s)) +
∣∣Es∈DRθR(s)∣∣+ ∣∣Es∈Dvar[RθR(s)]− ρ∣∣
)
,
where we set c = 0.25 and ρ = 5 in our experiments. During training, we sample a batch of 64
demonstrations D′ ⊂ D for each reward step in Algorithm 1, and calculate the regularization term
based on this sample set D′ instead of D. Though not shown in the figures, we mention that before
IRL training we also initialize the reward function by training RθR(s) for 5,000 iterations using only
φ(θR) above as the loss function.
Performances of the algorithm using Dǫ=.1 are shown in Fig. 2. First of all, Fig. 2(a) shows
that the IRL loss function (11) is improving during training. By IRL loss we refer to vˆf − vˆg based
on definitions in steps 9 and 10 in Algorithm 1, namely the objective function (11) of our IRL
algorithm (without the regularization term φ(θR)). This trend suggests that RθR(s) gradually learns
to explain the behaviors in the demonstration set. Meanwhile, as discussed above, the success of the
IRL algorithm relies on the quality of the Nash Equilibrium policy models we maintain during IRL
training. Although θR is being updated continuously and the Nash Equilibrium polices are expected
to be changing during training, Fig. 2(b) shows that the gaps between the performances of fθf , gθg and
their best possible performances are pretty marginal, thus indicating the good quality of both policy
models. The plot depicts vfθf ,gθg (s0;RθR),ming v
fθf ,g(s0;RθR),maxf v
f,gθg (s0;RθR), and shows that
the three values are close to each other for most of the iterations during training. Regarding the
property of the obtained reward function, Fig. 2(c) reveals a strong correlation (ρ = 0.65, p < .001)
between Rchasing(s) and the RθR(s) we recovered after 500,000 iterations of training. This strong
correlation indicates that the model learns that the reward of each state should be highly dependent
on D(s) and behaves similarly as Rchasing(s).
To further corroborate the quality of the recovered reward and policy functions we include two
more metrics. First, we compare the divergence between the IRL and Nash Equilibrium policies. As
shown in Fig. 2(d), we gauge the KL-divergence between the IRL and Nash Equilibrium policies and
plot the estimation performed on a batch of 64 randomly sampled states. When compared against
a model that acts randomly or the “early” policy models obtained after 20,000 iterations, the IRL
policies demonstrate behaviors that are most similar to those of the Nash Equilibrium policies.
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Figure 3: Trajectories generated by policy models obtained in the IRL algorithm. Each row presents
a different 8-step trajectory.
A more direct measurement is to plug IRL policies back into the chasing game and evaluate their
performances when competing against the Nash Equilibrium policies. In Fig. 2(e) we depict the
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Figure 4: Trajectories generated by policy models obtained at the 20,000-th iteration. Each row
presents a different 8-step trajectory. Clearly, these actions are not driven by Rchasing(s) = D(s) and
are different from the ones in Fig. 3.
performances of the IRL and Nash Equilibrium polices estimated in 64 rounds of games. The policies
fθf , gθg obtained after 500,000 iterations of IRL training demonstrate performances that are relatively
close to those of Nash Equilibrium policies.
In Fig. 3 we demonstrate the behaviors of IRL policies based on random trajectories generated
by fθf , gθg . Despite occasional mistakes (for example, in the first row of Fig. 3 one of the predators
chose not to move), the two predators are pursuing the preys in a coordinated way, and the preys are
actively keeping a distance from the predators.
There remains a concern on whether the prior knowledge in our regularization function is too
strong. If so, we should have approximated Rchasing(s) decently well from the beginning of our
training. We clear this doubt by inspecting the Nash Equilibrium policies early in the algorithm. In
Fig. 4, we show trajectories generated by policy models at the 20,000-th iteration. Note that we
also use models obtained at the 20,000-th iteration as the “early” models in Fig. 2 because at the
20,000-th iteration the Nash Equilibrium polices are of good qualities already (shown in Fig. 2(b))
while IRL training has just begun (shown in Fig. 2(a)). Obviously, for trajectories in Fig. 4 both
agents act remarkably different from policies shown in Fig. 3. To be specific, in Fig. 4 the preys try
to move to and stay at two corners on the diagonal of the grid, while the predators try to stay on
the diagonal of the two preys. This is not surprising since in φ(θR) we are encouraging the average
distance D¯(s) and R(s) to be correlated instead of the max-min distance D(s) and R(s), and the
behaviors of predators/preys serve to minimize/maximize D¯(s). Therefore, we confidently draw the
conclusion that the policies and the reward function are recovered by our IRL algorithm because of
the correctly proposed objective function that minimizes the performance gap rather than the prior
knowledge provided by the regularization terms.
A final comparison between models recovered by the IRL algorithm using Dǫ=.05, Dǫ=.1, and Dǫ=.2
illustrates the robustness of the performance of the IRL algorithm despite the variation of the qualities
in expert demonstrations. In Fig. 5(a) and (b) we show that IRL policies produced under different Dǫ
behave similarly when compared against Nash Equilibrium policies, and demonstrate nearly the same
performances in the original chasing game. In Fig. 5(c), we show that the quality of the demonstration
set affects the range of the reward function. Even though a similarly strong correlation (r ≈ .65) is
produced for each Dǫ, the scale of RθR(s) decreases when ǫ goes up. The larger the ǫ is, the less
distinctive the rewards of different states are in the reward function inferred by the IRL algorithm.
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Figure 5: Comparison of IRL performances under Dǫ with different ǫ values. (a) KL-divergence
between the IRL and Nash Equilibrium policies are similar under different Dǫ. Error bars indicate the
standard errors estimated on a batch of 64 samples. (b) Using different Dǫ we yield IRL policies that
perform similarly under the original Rchasing(s). The performances are measured in the same way as
in Fig. 2(e). Error bars indicate the standard deviation estimated on a batch of 64 rounds of games.
(c) Range of the recovered RθR(s) under different Dǫ. The larger the ǫ is, the smaller the range of
RθR(s). For readability of the figure a jitter is added to the x-coordinate of each scatter point.
This also explains why the different policies functions we recover perform similarly as shown in Fig.
5(a) and (b), since rescaling the reward function does not strongly affect the agents’ preferences for
different states, and thus the optimal policies remain largely unchanged. This is ideal as the success
of IRL training is not critically influenced by the quality of the available demonstration set, and from
sub-optimal demonstrations of distinct qualities the algorithm recovers policies that perform very well.
6.2.1 Key Findings
The proposed IRL algorithm aims to minimize the performance gap between the Nash Equilibrium
policies and the sub-optimal policies demonstrated in D. Under appropriate regularization, the gap
decreases to a relatively marginal level within the first 100,000 iterations of training, and we success-
fully recover the reward function and the optimal policies for the chasing game after 500,000 iterations
of training. The recovered reward function RθR(s) exhibits a strong correlation to R[chasing](s). The
recovered policies not only behave similarly when compared with the Nash Equilibrium policies, but
also demonstrate good performance when competing against them in the chasing game. We also
observe that the quality of the demonstration set affects the scale of the learned RθR(s), while the
performances of the recovered policies remain largely unchanged, which suggests the robustness of
IRL training despite variation in demonstrated sub-optimal policies.
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6.2.2 Comparison with existing IRL algorithms
Our IRL algorithm demonstrated is designed and tailored for two specific goals: to take sub-optimality
of expert demonstrations into account, and to cope with zero-sum games of large scales. We next
illustrate the superior performance of our algorithm in the chasing game regardless of the quality of the
demonstration set. The Bayesian-IRL [10] (BIRL) algorithm and Decentralized-IRL [9] (DIRL) are
selected as benchmark IRL algorithms since they are the only ones that solve competitive multi-agent
IRL tasks to the best of our knowledge. Both algorithms need modifications since deep neural nets
should be used as model approximations and the IRL training should proceed efficiently for large-scale
games that cannot be solved by tabular approaches with enumeration of states or actions. We next
provide the details.
The BIRL algorithm for zero-sum stochastic games formulates a quadratic programming problem
with constraints that require each demonstrated action to be the optimal one, and the objective
function represents the posterior of the current reward function given a Bayesian prior of reasonable
reward functions. Two problems arise when implementing the BIRL algorithm to solve the chasing
game. First, enumerating and imposing all the constraints is not tractable (there are 2 · Ns · |A| =
19, 531, 250 constraints in the current version of the game). Therefore, for each iteration in our
training, we sample a tuple (s, aE,f , aE,g) from D, and randomly choose actions (af , ag) from Af ×
Ag. In an iteration we consider only the constraints on the sampled state-action pairs. By adding
Lagrangians into the objective function to encourage the constraints, we charge a penalty whenever
the demonstrated actions aE,f , aE,g are performing worse than af , ag.
Another issue is that the BIRL algorithm requires explicit models for expert policies. The afore-
mentioned constraints in the BIRL algorithm are equivalent to Qf
E ,gE
f (s, a
E,f ) ≥ Qf
E,gE
f (s, a
f ) and
Qf
E ,gE
g (s, a
E,g) ≥ Qf
E,gE
g (s, a
g). Evaluation of the Q-functions are feasible only if fE, gE and the
corresponding state transition matrix are available and can be stored in a computer’s memory. In
[10] the expert policies are statistically recovered since sufficient demonstrations are available for a
significantly smaller game, which is impossible for large games. Instead of appealing to imitation
learning to yield expert model approximations, we conduct a two-phase training that does not rely
on expert policy models. We find the optimal state value function first, and then use the state-value
function and one-step transition probability (which can be approximated by sampling tuples from D)
to recover R. To be specific, the BIRL algorithm is based on the equality V = (I − γP )−1R where
V =
(
V (s)
)
s∈S
is the vector exhibiting the value for each state, R =
(
R(s)
)
s∈S
is the vector for the
reward at each state, and P is the state transition matrix under expert policies. To infer V from R,
the inversion of (I−γP )−1 necessitates expert policy models that can act in all states (including those
not demonstrated in D) and generate infinitely long trajectories. Instead, if the algorithm first finds
state value functions V (s) instead of R(s) and uses R = (I − γP )V to recover R, then only one-step
transitions that can be sampled directly from D are needed. Therefore, in our implementation the
first phase of training uses the BIRL algorithm to solve for vf
E ,gE
θV
(s), the vector representation of
which is the vector V above. The objective function is equal to the Lagrangian terms plus the same
regularization term φ(θR) used for our IRL algorithm (now viewed as prior of R in BIRL). In the
second phase, we sample a state s and corresponding expert actions from D, get the following state s′
under the known transition function, and train θR to minimize the squared loss between RθR(s) and
v
fE ,gE
θV
(s) − γvf
E ,gE
θV
(s′). Note that the objective function in the R-phase is also regularized by the
same φ(θR) in the V -phase, because in our experiments we have observed a drastic deterioration of
performances if the regularization term is not used for both phases. The model vf
E ,gE
θV
(s) and reward
RθR(s) are parametrized similarly as specified in Section 6.2. Lastly, since the BIRL algorithm returns
only a reward function, we use the proposed Nash Equilibrium algorithm to solve for f∗(RθR), g
∗(RθR)
after two-phase training.
The DIRL algorithm also assumes the optimality of expert policies under the unknown reward
function. The algorithm alternates between a π step and an R step. In the k-th iteration of training,
the algorithm first enters the π step that solves for the Nash Equilibrium policies (fk, gk) under current
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Table 1: Correlations between recovered reward functions and Rchasing
IRL Algorithm ǫ = .05 ǫ = .1 ǫ = .2
Algorithm 1 .65 .68 .66
BIRL .28 -.02 .12
DIRL -.31 -.15 .11
Table 2: Performance deterioration of recovered policies under Rchasing (*:Nash Eq.; A:Algorithm 1;
B:BIRL; D:DIRL)
Dǫ f
A fB fD gA gB gD
ǫ = .05 11.8% 24.1% 197.0% 4.4% 33.5% 38.9%
ǫ = .1 10.3% 44.3% 100.0% 6.9% 33.5% 41.9%
ǫ = .2 13.3% 68.5% 200.1% 9.3% 33.0% 40.9%
RθR . The policies (fk, gk) are added into a policy set Π. Then in the R step, the algorithm finds
RθR that maximizes
1
k
∑k
j=1
∑
s∈S p
(
vf
E ,gE (s)−vfj ,g
E
(s)
)
+p
(
vf
E ,gj (s)−vf
E ,gE (s)
)
−φ(θR), where
p(x) = max(x, 0)+2 ·min(x, 0). This objective function encourages R to favor fE, gE when competing
against any policies in Π, which is aligned with the optimality assumption that (fE, gE) are indeed
Nash Equilibrium of the game.
To alleviate the overhead of storing and calling all the policies in Π, in the R step of our deep
implementation we maximize a slightly different objective function E(fj ,gj)∼ΠE(s, , )∼D
[
p
(
vf
E ,gE (s)−
vfj ,g
E
(s)
)
+ p
(
vf
E ,gj (s)− vf
E ,gE (s)
)
− φ(θR)
]
. Thus, in each training iteration we only sample one
pair of (fj , gj) from Π and pit them against expert policies, so the expectation of this new objective
function remains unchanged when compared with the original one. Again, models of fE , gE are still
required to evaluate the state value functions. Here we adopt the treatment of the original DIRL work
[9] and our IRL algorithm; we let fE , gE to act at the first step of each trajectory by sampling from
D, then we use the latest (fk, gk) to act for all the following steps to generate the full trajectory.
To make sure we are performing a fair comparison, the number of training iteration for each al-
gorithm is set to match the runtime of all 3 algorithms. For both phases in the algorithm, training
lasts for 500,000 iterations. For the Lagragians in BIRL training, we use a fixed coefficient for all
constraints instead of a unique and dynamically updated coefficient for each one, which would the-
oretically require another neural network models for λ(s, a). Besides, the fixed coefficient is set to
be 1 since we can change the weights in φ(θR) instead, which is similar to the original treatment in
[10]. We set the weight coefficient c in φ(θR) to be .25 to match up with the one in our algorithm.
The DIRL algorithm is computationally demanding largely due to the time spent on solving for Nash
Equilibrium at each iteration of training. To control the runtime of the DIRL algorithm within a
comparable range of the other IRL methodologies in our experiment, we perform 10 iterations with
50,000 training iterations for both the π and R steps in each iteration. For both algorithms, policies
and reward function models are parametrized similarly as specified in Section 6.2. The learning rate
is set to be 10−4, weight c of regularization term is set as .25 and Adam [19] is used as optimizer. We
mention that, even under such a specification, DIRL training still more than tripled the runtime of
the other algorithms in our experiments.
We summarize the result of experiments in Table 1 and 2. Under the same regularization terms,
only our IRL algorithm finds a reward function that bears reasonably high correlation with Rchasing(s).
We also plug the solved IRL policies back into the original chasing game and compete against the
Nash Equilibrium policies, and measure the gap between their performances and vf
∗,g∗ to evaluate
how much the performance of the recovered policies deteriorate. As shown in Table 2, only our
IRL algorithm recovers policies of good quality, and the performance is not largely affected by the
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demonstration set we use. The issues with the BIRL algorithm are the requirement of accurate expert
policy models and the strict optimality constraints of expert actions, whereas the number of reference
policies in Π is likely to be highly critical to the success of the DIRL algorithm. In conclusion, our
IRL algorithm overcomes the issues in the benchmark algorithms, and outperforms them significantly
when all the algorithms are implemented and utilized in the same setting.
6.3 Nash Equilibrium Algorithm
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Figure 6: Performance of the proposed Nash Equilibrium algorithm in the chasing game
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Figure 7: Trajectories generated by the trained models in the chasing game. Each row presents a
different 8-step trajectory.
The Nash Equilibrium algorithm assumes that the reward function is available. We herein showcase
the algorithm’s performance under Rchasing(s). As noted before, Algorithm 2 is meant for finding
f∗(R), and a separate training procedure is carried out to solve for g∗(R). We only discuss in detail
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training of f∗(R) because the same hyper-parameters and model structures are used for training
g∗(R).
In this section, we use the word “iteration” to refer to i in Algorithm 2. The following hyper
parameters are used in Algorithm 2 for the experiments in this section and those already presented
in Section 6.2. When performing PPO style training, we set horizon length T as 10, and refresh
frequency Krefresh as 10. Parameter λ for eligibility traces is set as 0.9. Regarding the adversarial
training, we set Kcycle as 100 and Kg as 90, under which the frequency of the g and f step is 9 : 1.
As mentioned above, a batch of 64 agents (parametrized by current θtargetf , θ
target
g ) act simultaneously
from independently initialized starting states. The 64 trajectories are used together for the stochastic
gradient descent steps in the g or f step in Algorithm 2. Meanwhile, inspired by [18], for the first
5,000 iterations of every 50,000 iterations we perform the g step only. This is to ensure the quality
of gθg , which is expected to be the best possible response to current fθf during training. In our
experiment, we used Adam [19] as the optimizer due to its superior performance when training deep
models. The learning rate for best response models is set as 3 · 10−4, while the learning rate for the
Nash Equilibrium policies fθf , gθg is 10
−4. This configuration makes sure that changes in the latest
fθf are slow enough for the best response opponent model to adjust itself. Again, we use Adam to
perform stochastic optimization on our models.
Fig. 6 shows the evolution of the performances of policy models. The plot depicts vfθf ,gθg (s0;Rchasing),
ming v
fθf ,g(s0;Rchasing), maxf v
f,gθg (s0;Rchasing). Recall that if fθf and gθg manage to reach the Nash
Equilibrium, the three series should converge perfectly. As the figure shows, the adversarial training
on fθf and gθg succeed in decreasing the gap to a pretty marginal level, suggesting that fθf and gθg
should be close enough to the Nash Equilibrium policies and there is little room to further improve
their performances.
To further corroborate the quality of the learned policies, in Fig. 7 we plot trajectories showing
behaviors of the obtained fθf and gθg . As demonstrated in the figure, both the predators and the preys
understand their goals in the game. The predators allocate the tasks so that they are not chasing the
same prey and ignoring the other one, while the strategy of the preys is that they run away actively
and try not to stay at the same cell, thus making it harder for the predators to pursue both of them.
6.3.1 Key Findings
By adopting the framework of adversarial training and alternating between the Nash Equilibrium
policies and the best response policies, the proposed Nash Equilibrium algorithm successfully solves
the chasing game. The performance of the Nash Equilibrium policy reaches a decent level within the
first 100,000 iterations of training. Both the predator and the prey models demonstrate a strategy
that is driven by Rchasing(s), and the two players on the same team learn to cooperate with each other.
6.3.2 Comparison with existing Nash Equilibrium algorithm
To further demonstrate the superiority of the proposed Nash Equilibrium algorithm particularly for
large games, we reformulate the quadratic programming problem proposed on page 125 in [?], which
inspires the gradient descent algorithm to solve for Nash Equilibrium proposed in [14]. We select only
this algorithm as the benchmark in this section, since the algorithm in [13], due to its formulation,
was observed to provide a zero gradient to policies when training in zero-sum games, and we do not
find an easy solution to apply the algorithm in [12] to large games using deep neural nets as model
approximations.
Here we illustrate the deep implementation we used for the benchmark algorithm in the experi-
ment. The algorithm maintains both policy models f, g and models for bounds of state value functions
vf (s), vg(s). The softmax layers in policy models guarantee f(a|s), g(a|s) to be well-defined distribu-
tions. Therefore, the remaining constraints are
R(s) + γEag∼g(a|s),s′∼p(s′|s,af ,ag)v
f (s′) ≤ vf (s) for any s, af ,
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Table 3: Performances of solved Nash Equilibrium policies (A:Algorithm 2; B:Benchmark; R:Random)
Grid Size fA, gA fB, gA fR, gA fA, gB fA, gR
5× 5 -20.3 -21.2 -41.1 -20.0 -14.9
10× 10 -44.7 -87.4 -94.2 -42.2 -31.8
−R(s) + γEaf∼f(a|s),s′∼p(s′|s,af ,ag)v
g(s′) ≤ vg(s) for any s, ag,
and the objective is to minimize Es[v
f (s) + vg(s)]. The constraints are implemented as Lagrangians
with a coefficient λ. Similarly to the implementation of the benchmark BIRL algorithm, we do not
enumerate all the constraints, but only sample s from S and af , ag from f(a|s), g(a|s) at each iteration
of training. Whenever a constraint on the sampled state-action pair is violated, a penalty is added
to the objective function that motivates f, g to avoid taking sub-optimal actions. To evaluate the
expectation in each constraint, we sample 5 trajectories for each constraint. Training lasts for 500,000
iterations. Both policies and value models are parametrized as in our Nash Equilibrium algorithm.
Theoretically speaking, for each state-action pair, the corresponding constraint should have its own λ
(which necessitates an extra neural network model) that would be constantly updated in each iteration.
Since we are not enumerating the constraints, we set λ to be a fixed value throughout training, and
conduct grid search on the optimal value of λ. According to our experiments, performance of the
algorithm is not very sensitive to the value λ, and we use λ = 10 for the results shown in this section
since it appears to be the optimal value in our experiments.
We summarize the results in Table 3. In our experiments we compared the performances of both
algorithms in the original chasing game (with a 5×5 grid) and a larger game (with a 10×10 grid). The
values are the average of a batch of 64 trajectories with randomly initialized starting states. We also
show the performances under random policies as a reference. For the game on the 5×5 grid, we see that
our algorithm yields a better policy for predators, while preys of both algorithms perform similarly.
For the game on the 10× 10 grid, the benchmark algorithm learned a much worse policy for predators
(the improvement of our algorithm is −87.4−(−44.7)−87.4 = 48.6% from the benchmark algorithm), and the
policies for preys learned by our algorithm are −44.7−(−42.2)−42.2 = 5.9% better than that of the benchmark
algorithm. Overall, our adversarial training algorithm for Nash Equilibriums in zero-sum stochastic
games shows a significantly improved performance against the benchmark algorithm, especially for
larger cases.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
IRL tasks differ significantly from traditional reinforcement learning tasks. In IRL settings, we are
given a set of expert demonstrations to infer the underlying reward function that drives the observed
behaviors. For competitive multi-agent IRL tasks, existing methods assume the optimality of expert
demonstrations, and the two agents involved in a zero-sum stochastic game are decoupled in those
algorithms. In this paper, we propose a new framework for competitive multi-agent IRL tasks that
takes sub-optimality of expert demonstrations into account.
We propose an IRL algorithm with the objective to explicitly minimize the performance gap
between expert policies and Nash Equilibrium strategies. In order to solve for a Nash Equilibrium
strategy, we also propose an adversarial training algorithm, and show its theoretical appeal in the
non-existence of local optimum in the objective function. For our experiments, neural networks are
used as model approximations so that the algorithm recovers both the reward and the policy functions
in a game that is too large for existing competitive multi-agent IRL methodologies.
The work concerns discounted stochastic games where the state information is completely public
to both agents. For future research, a natural extension to the current work is to adapt the framework
to partially observable MDPs, Nevertheless, as mentioned in [9] finding Nash Equilibriums becomes
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much more challenging than in our case. Meanwhile, another natural generalization is to explore how
our gradient-based Nash Equilibrium algorithm can be applied to general-sum games.
Our theoretical analysis of Algorithm 2 suggests that the gradient to improve the Nash Equilibrium
policy models should be evaluated against all the best response models. Therefore, it is an interesting
direction to see how a multitude of best response opponent models can help improve the performance
of the Nash Equilibrium algorithm. Besides, scaling up the Nash Equilibrium algorithm for even larger
games might entail improvements on the efficiency and stability of our adversarial training. Aside
from existing works such as [20], it is worth exploring how a better estimated gradient can be provided
to policy models in the algorithm, and how the policy models realize and adjust to the changes in
their opponents.
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